As arguably its first major action of the new year, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on January 6 issued a new general license (GL) in response to last month’s fall of the government of Bashar Assad in Syria. Most notably, this GL comes perhaps as a result of not only the recent political change but also the not insignificant number of OFAC-sanctioned parties forming Syria’s new ruling class, starting first and foremost with Ahmad Al-Sharaa (aka Abu Muhammad Al-Jawlani). (Oddly, the Hayat Tahrir Al-Shaam movement running the country, commonly referred to as HTS, is not on the SDN List despite its former ties to certain SDN-designated groups).
GL-24 was issued pursuant to three sets of regulations – the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 542 (the “SSR”), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (the “GTSR”), and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (the “FTOSR”). This authorization enables transactions with the current government related to the provision of energy, and transactions involving the transmittal of noncommercial remittances to Syria that involve the country’s central bank, itself an SDN. OFAC has stated this is to ensure the continued governance of Syria as well as to help with power outages in the country.
The GL expires on July 7, 2025, meaning it’s valid for 6 months. Clearly this authorization is not a blank check and does not mean sanctions against Syria are over.
Syria has been and remains under a very complex web of sanctions, even after Assad’s fall. This is a mix of regulations, such as the SSR, Executive Orders, and other authorities that are not country-specific. Currently, US sanctions prohibit, inter alia, US persons from exporting services to Syria, importing petroleum and petroleum products from the country, and investing there – notably the importation of most goods from Syria is permitted.
There are presently just under 200 legal persons with Syria addresses named to the SDN List, which could mean that the actual number of “blocked” entities (meaning those on named on the SDN List, plus others not named but considered SDNs as they surpass the threshold for ‘blocking” under OFAC regulations and are treated effectively the same way) may be significantly higher. The political realities on the ground in Syria mean as is the case with Iran, entities are designated by OFAC under a host of varying legal authorities. Notably, despite the near comprehensive embargo against the country, US persons are authorized to engage many commercial transactions in the northwestern part of the country – see 31 CFR § 542.533.
The dynamic of US-Syria relations in the post-Assad era will be evolving, and we may see Syria following Afghanistan, whereby certain governing authorities remain on the SDN List, while certain dealings become authorizes through broad GLs.
Remember that OFAC general licenses are self-executing – the authorizations apply so long as one complies with all applicable regulations. There is no need to apply for these authorizations.
Side note: Compliance geeks will find a key screening lesson in all of this. OFAC’s own online search engine includes Al-Jawlani, which is effectively the interim prime minister’s nom de guerre, and not his real name, Ahmed Al-Sharaa. Also the birth years in that database are 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979, though it his commonly understood that he was born in 1982. One of the private screening solutions shows numerous aliases, including the Al-Sharaa last name. While this type of discrepancy or omission may be more of an anomaly, it underscores the frequent need for detailed due diligence beyond what may be available on say, the agency’s website.

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