How will an Iran/P5+1 Accord Impact Sanctions?

There is much curiosity surrounding what the immediate (as opposed to long term) impact of an accord between Iran and the Permanent UN Security Council members (the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) and Germany (the so-called “P5+1”) can have on the U.S. sanctions regime on Iran. Indeed, a number of posts on this blog and my other blog (MENALawyer.com) have discussed this issue.  As we all saw, no deal came through last night, presumably due to a difference of opinion in the P5+1 side.  That said, negotiations will resume on November 20, and many appear to be hopeful that the big breakthrough will happen then.

Contrary to what many people think, an accord between the P5+1 is not the end of all tensions between Iran and the western world, and naturally it does not signify the restoration of economic ties between Iran and the west. It could (emphasis here) mark the beginning of a thaw in those relations and the eventual roll-back of sanctions. I’ve been thinking that many may see a handshake between EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif (or especially one with US Secretary of State John Kerry shaking hands with Dr. Zarif) as a sign that everything is fine and dandy between Iran and the rest of the world. That’s when mistakes and violations start creeping up.

What has been discussed is that Iran may have access to certain revenues from the sale of its oil to various countries that are effectively frozen. Due to recent US legislation of the past few years, many of these funds that are not denominated in local currencies are basically in a “frozen” state – meaning, if say a country in Asia has paid for Iranian oil in Euros, those Euros are more than likely stuck in a bank in that country.  US laws can impose sanctions on countries that remit Iran’s oil income back to Iran through the Central Bank of Iran, so what has happened is that Iran’s oil money is sitting in locally denominated bank accounts in those countries. Therefore, instead of receiving dollars or RMB directly back in Iran from sales to China, Iran instead has essentially RMB-denominated trust account for much of its oil sales to China and can use that account to buy goods from that country.  What has been proposes is that some of this money (in the tens of billions of dollars) be unblocked and made free to be sent back to Iran.

The other existing limits on business will largely stay in place. Businesses around the world, including the United States, look to be gearing up for the day that they will be free to trade with Iran, and that may come soon if everything goes well. However, for the time being, expect most sanctions as they impact day to day matters (such as financial transfers, exports, etc.) to remain largely the same. What may happen is that agencies like OFAC in the United States may be more open to licensing activities that it may normally not license or that may be a bit too tangential from what it normally licenses. But it is probably safe to say that activities that fall squarely within the prohibited column and have no convincing public policy arguments supporting their approval will stay off limits and it is accordingly a safe bet that OFAC will not authorize them.

The further Iran and the P5+1 go down the negotiating path, we may see some peeling back of sanctions laws and the gradual reentry of Iran into the world’s oil and financial markets (with various countries opening up to Iran at various speeds).  Even then, there is no reason to expect sanctions to be completely rolled back in the immediate foreseeable future. Remember, politicians can shake hands for photo opps all day, but what ultimately shapes things is whether or not the laws or directives change (or at least waivers are granted).

Therefore, between perception based on current events, some limited sanctions relief and a change in mood, there will be great room for confusion.  The best policy remains to not believe any change until you see it, and to stay on the safe side. That’s to say compliance will remain critical and even if laws begin to change, anybody choosing to engage in transactions with Iran should keep a finger on the pulse of where the law stands as this can change at any given moment.  Too much hope can lead to too much confidence which can open the door to violations and folly. Keep your eye on the news, but also on the law.

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Obama Speaks to Rouhani: Will Iran be Open for (US) Business?

Well, the two men have spoken. On Friday, President Obama called Iranian President Hassan Rouhani as the latter was leaving for Tehran following a four day tour to New York to take part in the annual United Nations General Assembly.  Today the New York Times reported that Rouhani’s Chief of Staff Dr. Nahavandian met on Tuesday with a group of prominent American businessmen (in the banking and energy sector) in New York.  The subject was Iran will be ready for investment once/if the sanctions are lifted.  Even Fox Business had some pieces on the removal of sanctions and even the cost the Iran sanctions are imposing on the US.

So the question everybody is asking is, are sanctions going to disappear?

Maybe so, but despite the lightning speed progress that we have witnessed in US-Iran relations, any sanctions relief will be a long drawn-out process.  Depending on the pace of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, many things can change quickly. These can likely happen on two fronts:

1. Secondary Sanctions Against Iran. These are restrictions like those in the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) which penalize third countries (e.g., France, Japan, etc.) that invest beyond a certain amount in Iran’s energy sector. The President may seek to waive some of these sanctions for purposes of national interest.  Other examples include the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR), which can impose penalties on third country banks that engage in certain dealings with Iran.

2. US Sanctions on Iran.  The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) could continue issuing general licenses (as it has been lately) that expand the window of what is allowed to be exported to Iran.  This could take the form of allowing Iran to procure civilian aircraft and parts more easily, and allowing US persons to export services to certain non-sensitive sectors in Iran.  OFAC could also remove some entities, like Iranian port entities and banks off the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.

Before we get carried away envisioning a sanctions reduction, the question remains – what can US persons do now?  Well, there are a few windows that are now open (subject to strict limitations, including those on end-users, banking and shipping, among other things), such as:

1. Sale of certain communications equipment to Iran (e.g., laptops, tablets, mobiles, routers, etc.)

2. Sale of certain medicines, medical supplies, and food products (in some cases a license is needed, but not in others if you are within certain parameters); and

3. Registration of Intellectual Property (IP) in Iran (and vice-versa).

The realm of permitted trade with Iran is all subject to very strict restrictions and conditions, and any increase in trade (be it in the currently authorized arena or any spaces which will be created through relaxation) will require an exceptionally heightened need for compliance with all applicable regulations. The reason is two-fold – the laws may start changing quite dramatically and rapidly (as we’ve sen with Burma) and companies may find themselves more confused while at the same time wanting to make use of whatever channels they have to tap into the Iranian market.  In order to prevent violations (such as going into prohibited territory such as facilitation, etc.) it will be critical that everybody knows the limits of what is allowed and all applicable terms and conditions imposed by law.

It remains to be seen if and how this trajectory in bilateral relations will continue, and it may take quite some time before normalcy is reestablished.  For the time being, all eyes should be to compliance and making sure that you have a finger on the exact status of the law.  Indeed, maybe the US government may allow Iran to be open for business, not only for third country companies, but for American ones as well. Until then, never forget compliance!

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New OFAC General Licenses for Iran Humanitarian and Athletic Activities

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today issued two general licenses (E and F) related to certain humanitarian and athletic activity involving Iran.  This is but one more step in the direction of the Administration’s de facto policy of loosening restrictions on lower level, less sensitive activities (to therefore presumably ratchet up pressure on more important issues).

General License E addresses humanitarian matters. Specifically, these include certain activities related to:

  • “the provision of donated health-related services; operation of orphanages; provision of relief services related to natural disasters; distribution of donated articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine” (note exporting food, clothing and medicine towards the relief of human suffering was previously allowed).
  • Certain non-commercial reconstruction following a natural disaster
  • Certain sponsorship of conferences on human rights and related matters as well as surveying, etc.
  • Related transfers of funds related to NGOs up to $500,000 in an aggregate 12-month period

Note the reporting requirements. Indeed, NGOs must report certain activities to OFAC on a quarterly basis.  Obviously, blocked entities are still generally off limits.

General License F is also interesting.  It covers athletic activities, following on the coattails of Iranian tennis referee Adel Borghei’s case (see the immediately previous entry on this blog and the article in last week’s New York Times).  If you remember, Mr. Borghei’s offer to referee at the U.S. Open was rescinded until another lawyer and I managed to secure an OFAC license for him to provide services there.

This new general license (quite possibly at least partially the result of Borghei’s case) would fix this, by allowing U.S. persons to provide certain athletic services in Iran and vice versa, whether the event is amateur or professional.  It specifically includes, among other things, an authorization to engage in “activities related to exhibition matches and events, the sponsorship of players, coaching, refereeing, and training.”  This can be a huge issue given the significant number of Iranian-American coaches and refs who now may be recruited to provide services in Iran in areas such as soccer.  The sponsorship will also be interesting as it could lead to U.S. sponsoring of Iranian athletes.

Posted in Cultural, Iran, OFAC, Sanctions, Uncategorized

Happy Ending to the Sanctions Tennis Story

For those wondering about the previous post regarding Iranian tennis referee Adel Borghei, happy news to report in case you have not kept up with the news (there was quite a lengthy follow-up article in the New York Times, which quotes me.  We were able to obtain an OFAC license for him to referee in the US Open tennis tournament in New York and he managed to referee for about a week before heading back to Iran on Friday. 

You may recall that Mr. Borghei was initially invited to serve at the US Open, only to have that offer rescinded on the grounds of US sanctions.  Another law firm and my firm (Akrivis Law Group, PLLC) decided to take the case pro bono and petitioned before OFAC.  We received the license with blistering speed.  I managed to see Adel at the US Open and he seemed quite happy to be there (as the Times article also indicates).

The case illustrates the many complexities of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 560 (the “ITSR”) and how the US sanctions regime against Iran can tremendously impact individuals, a recurring theme on this blog and its sister site MENALawyer.com.  OFAC has taken some steps to rectify these things, such as by revising the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR) into the ITSR last October, and other moves such as  issuing General License D, which allows the export of certain personal communications devices and software, including laptops, tablets, mobile phones, etc.  

The issue of Iranians in Iran working here and US persons working in Iran is a sensitive one and this case is testament to that.  That said, Adel’s story is just the tip of the iceberg for those who are curious about the immigration aspects of Iranians working here and the potentially severe implications of US persons (including dual national Iranian-Americans) working in Iran.

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Farhad Alavi Quoted by New York Times

I was quoted in the New York Times on an article regarding the impact of sanctions on the rescission of an employment offer by the US Tennis Association (USTA) to an Iran-based tennis referee. The article discusses the on the need in this case for the referee, Adel Borghei, to obtain approval from the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to be able to work in such a capacity.

The article really speaks to what I call the “personal” impact of the sanctions.  Many of these laws may have valid rationale, but they do wind up impacting individuals and organizations in ways that OFAC and other government officials likely never really thought.  The provision in the law that prohibits the USTA from hiring Mr. Borghei for this case was likely put into effect to prohibit Iranians from being recruited here for small tasks that could harm security, etc., not for athletic activities like this.  OFAC regulations impact a whole host of even more benign personal activities. Given that the Administration has evidently hinted that it wants to lower the restrictions on basic activities in order to rachet up enforcement on more high level matters (as seen by recent reforms in the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, ITSR, and the new General License D authorizing certain computer-related exports to Iran) it would be interesting if this case causes OFAC to issue guidance or perhaps even repeal certain limitations that are cumbersome both for individuals and for the enforcers.

 

Posted in Iran, OFAC, Personal, Sanctions, Uncategorized

The Great Sanctions Shipping Saga

It has been a number of years that the United States has been chasing down the Iranian shipping industry. Some years ago, OFAC designated the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and a number of Iranian vessels on the SDN list.  Last week, the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (the IFCA) went into effect. It is part of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (the “2013 NDAA”). This very well may be the most potent blow against Iran’s shipping (and in large part economy), by placing severe sanctions on third country entities engaging in certain significant dealings with Iran’s energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors.  Notably, there are certain exceptions for food, medicine, and medical supplies, though it remains to be see if these humanitarian goods do not [again] become a victim of companies shunning even those transactions related to Iran that are legal out of a fear of violating the law.

There has been significant talk of Iran re-flagging vessels and playing a game of cat and mouse against the shipping world. Notably, this article in Forbes by Claudia Rosset, was very interesting.  Titled Have Tehran’s Tankers Hijacked the Tanzanian Flag?, the piece is definitely informative, but I am not sure it is fully an article and not entirely an editorial.  That said, it does illustrate the practices that the Iranian shipping industry has by engaged in by many accounts.

One key question is – do the parties mentioned in the article, e.g., the Tanzanian maritime authorities, the parties they have apparently outsourced their vessel registration to, etc. have the requisite sophistication to interpret such exceptionally esoteric laws as the IFCA? My thoughts in reading this law is that, as somebody with as many years of experience on sanctions law as I do, these regulations are exceptionally complicated.  I can only imagine what they are like for lawyers outside the trade bar, much less non-lawyers, and non-lawyers who are not native English speakers, such as many of the folks in the international shipping industry.

Relatively very few practitioners likely have a detailed, thorough understanding of these laws.  As such, I can see a situation where many are still violating these regulations, not intentionally necessarily.  This begs the question – is the US State Department going to go after all these violators?  Will and if so, how will these companies be brought into compliance? 

Companies should educate themselves on this law.  As I have often said, “we do not deal with Iran” is a very easy, but intellectually lazy answer.  Given Iran’s reportedly wide use of front companies, it is critical that companies enact robust compliance programs that are more than just skin deep – screening and doing due diligence (and appropriately documenting it) on their potential counterparties, among other measures.  Again, while exposure does naturally vary based on the type of business and other related facts, this matter does highlight the fact that compliance is not a luxury but a necessity for companies in the international trade realm.

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Farhad Alavi Quoted by Financial Times on Impact of New Iran Sanctions

Farhad Alavi, principal of Akrivis Law Group and editor of this blog, was quoted in an article in Thursday’s Financial Times. In this article, titled “West increases penalties for business with Iran” (a similar article was also published with the headline “Iran faces tighter sanctions”), Mr. Alavi is quoted as discussing the impact of the latest sanctions brought into effect under the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of 2013 (2013 NDAA). The 2013 NDAA places significant restrictions on parties engaging in certain transactions against Iran, particularly in the shipping, shipbuilding, and energy sectors of that country. These sanctions came into effect earlier this month. This article highlights the challenges that this new law will bring about in Dubai, UAE which has traditionally been a large reexport hub for Iran.  

The Financial Times is one of the world’s leading dailies, published out of London and circulated internationally.  The article can be read here.

Posted in Uncategorized

Farhad Alavi Quoted in the UAE’s The National

I was quoted in Abu Dhabi-based The National, the leading English-language daily, with quotes in the United Arab Emirates on Wednesday, July 3. More specifically, the quotes are in two articles addressing the latest round of U.S. sanctions that went into effect against Iran on July 1 and their impact on trade between the UAE and Iran.

The two articles are and can be accessed by clicking the below links.

(1) UAE businesses to feel effect of fresh US sanctions on Iran
(2) Is trade with Iran worth the risk for UAE companies?

Posted in Uncategorized

Farhad Alavi Quoted in the UAE’s The National

I was quoted in Abu Dhabi-based The National, the leading English-language daily, with quotes in the United Arab Emirates on Wednesday, July 3. More specifically, the quotes are in two articles addressing the latest round of U.S. sanctions that went into effect against Iran on July 1 and their impact on trade between the UAE and Iran.

The two articles are and can be accessed by clicking the below links.

(1) UAE businesses to feel effect of fresh US sanctions on Iran
(2) Is trade with Iran worth the risk for UAE companies?

Posted in Uncategorized

Will Iran’s Presidential Elections Impact the Sanctions?

With  a day left before polls open in Iran, there’s been much press given to this year’s presidential elections in Iran. Some have written these elections off due to the limited power the President holds in Iran and some have dismissed the polls due to what many may consider a lack of choice.  However, the election is still important from a sanctions perspective.  Most people watching the three presidential debates noticed that sanctions featured prominently and indeed sanctions are reportedly an important part of Iran’s political discourse these days. The more central question this week is, will the outcome of the election impact the sanctions regime?

I’m clearly just a lawyer and not a political analyst, but I would have to say yes. The sanctions effectively rest on three pillars – (1) [most importantly] Iran’s nuclear program; (2) Iran’s alleged sponsorship of international terrorism; and (3) human rights.  Although the roles of Iran’s different (and often conflicting) power centers are not as institutionally defined as those of their western counterparts, the President does have some say in these three. Furthermore, as many have noted, the presidency in Iran still somewhat sets the tone of the  image that Iran projects overseas.  

The new president will have some leeway in selecting the nuclear negotiation team. Will he appoint ideologues or pragmatists? Reformist candidate Dr. Hassan Rowhani has overtly boasted about splitting U.S. and EU opinion on Iran during his tenure as the head of the negotiation team.

A team that shows good faith and even inches towards a deal can help reduce tensions. Additionally, people generally assign little value to optics.  Outgoing president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad effectively took on a “bring it on” attitude towards sanctions and it appeared as if he was actually looking to make enemies. The image that the government projects internationally can impact public opinion and can make the imposition (or removal) of sanctions easier or harder. 

Assuming the current head of the negotiation team Dr. Saeed Jalili does not win (if he does, expect more of the same), the new president, whether it is Dr. Rowhani or the more conservative Drs. Ali Akbar Velayati or Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf will undoubtedly try to impose some modicum of damage control on Iran’s relations with the outside world. Undoubtedly, if a new negotiation team comes on board and even inches marginally towards a deal, this could be enough to repeal at least part of the sanctions. This could create a domino effect, but we shouldn’t hold our breath – absent a very quick deal between Iran and the P5+1 sanctions are going to be here for quite a while, albeit possibly in a lighter form. 

What would be first on the agenda? If a tentative agreement is reached, expect to see the U.S. reallowing Iran to receive gold for oil, perhaps, or removing certain secondary sanctions, such as those on bank dealings and certain energy transactions or restrictions on Iran’s central bank.  Banking is at the crux of the sanctions, and it is improbable that Iran will be readmitted into SWIFT any time soon, even if Iran’s negotiation team becomes a bit more friendly. The United States knows that even a slight reversing of the tide could have immensely positive impacts on Iran’s domestic economy by allowing more oil exports, more hard currency and more confidence in the economy by average Iranians. Starving Iran’s economy has been a U.S. objective for years, so the United States will likely look to reach a significant, high value deal before cutting even a noticeable break.

Naturally the major limitations on U.S. persons will likely stay for a while – there are less sensitive sanctions that are easier sells domestically that will go first. And they will need to go – for even if the US was to lift the bulk of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 560 (the ITSR) tomorrow, most of the then-permitted transactions would still be logistically very challenging without adequate ways to ship goods or receive payments for them.  

While a quick, Burma-type reversal of sanctions is unlikely to happen in Iran, it is clear that any removal of sanctions will inevitably impact players around the world and can detoxify Iran’s name in the eyes of international business.  It will indeed be a battle of wills. 

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This website aims to provide notes and commentary on international legal, business, and political developments in economic and other sanctions. It is intended solely for information and entertainment purposes and should in no way be construed as legal advice. Laws, regulations, and policies change from time to time so some information on older posts can very easily be dated. If you have any questions or are unclear on any of the subject matters addressed or discussed on this site, please consult a licensed legal professional. Views presented in the comments and outside links do not necessarily reflect those of the website author. All external links on this website to articles and documents are external and provided for informational purposes only. They have no relation to the author of this website unless specified otherwise.

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